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PROGRESS, VALUES, AND RESPONSIBILITY
Hans Lenk, University of Karlsruhe
"In any case, progress implies that it looks much greater than it really is." 
This statement by the Austrian poet Johann Nestroy became famous when Ludwig
Wittgenstein chose it as a text for the beginning of his Philosophical
Investigations.  Is it true, however?  It seems to be true for the problems,
methods, and methodologies of philosophy itself—for Wittgenstein's own
investigations, which depend on Georg Lichtenberg, Arthur Schopenhauer, Fritz
Mauthner, and other forerunners.  But it does not seem to be true for technical or
technological progress.  Instead, we might say that, "Technical progress is much
greater than seems to be the case."  
But technical progress is not identical with cultural or moral progress. 
Discrepancies between the two have been highlighted and focused on time and
again; these discrepancies have also been used— e.g., by Albert Schweitzer, C.
P. Snow, Daniel Bell, and Arthur Koestler—to explain untoward effects. 
Progress as a unique general social phenomenon, without any differentiation, does
not exist.  
However, there are systems interlockings and systems effects which had
been discovered already in the twenties by the philosopher of economics, F. von
Gottl-Ottlilienfeld.  In his classic, Wirtschaft und Technik [economics and
technology] (1923), he stressed the "interlocking of individual steps toward a total
movement of technology":  namely, creative analogies from different fields,
combinations of results from earlier progress that are preconditions of a genuinely
innovative technical progress in general—which has to be relevant to the
fulfilment of demands.  He also said that technical progress has to be distinguished
from technological progress, which is progress in knowledge about and of
technologies even where no technical progress has occured.  Progress in
technological knowledge, moreover, is extremely important for the mutual
interlocking of subsystems.  Here von Gottl-Ottlilienfeld mentions system
continuities, technological and technical mutations (the jump to another basic
problem solution), as well as systematic contexts for individual technical problems
and solutions (his name for this is Eigenleben or "proper context") and derivative
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problems and solutions.  All together, these eventually lead to a unitary system of
technical questioning or probing, i.e., to a kind of methodological unity.  The
"self-advancement" (Selbststeigerung) of technological progress is here rendered
in system terms (see Ropohl, 1979).  
This led, later on (see Hübner, 1968), to the idea of modern technology
"becoming self aware," and this idea led to applications in cybernetics.
What is characteristic of technological development, of ever accelerating
technical progress in its overall situation in our society today?  Doubtless one
characteristic is the fact that moral and legal concepts, except when they have
been modified, have not kept up with technological applications.  Hans Sachsse,
the late Nestor of German philosophy of technology, claimed, for instance, that
concepts like "property," "theft," "just," "exchange," and even
"consumption"—developed in view of the classical concept of possession of
goods, of some kind of underlying or philosophical category of substance which
cannot be multiplied—cannot be simply transferred to the new concept of
information.
Moreover, rapidly changing circumstances in modern life in  dynamic
and pluralistic societies—as well as the accelerating dynamics of social, political,
economic, and technological conditions—also require respective changes in the
applicability conditions of ethical concepts and opinions.  Quantifiable acceleration
here also engenders a kind of shifting accent if not causal changes within the
systems themselves.  Omissions have become, ethically speaking, much more
important than in earlier times.  Often very dramatic collisions of values—even
the generation of fundamentally new values—even lead to a new kind of social
harm.  Think, for example, of the results of applying the products of recent
scientific medicine, of the overpopulation problem, and of other "social traps" (as
sociologists call them) which may lead to a new kind of "tragedy of the commons"
(to use Garrett Hardin's term).
In any case, the most decisive point demanding a new interpretation of the
ethics of technological progress is, beyond any doubt, the immensity of
technological power, which has grown to an extent and with such intensity that
some kind of systems backlash, a kind of overkill effect of a self-destroying
dynamic, might occur or might already be occurring.  This is particularly evident
PHIL & TECH 2:3-4 Spring, Summer 1997  Lenk, Progress, Values, Responsibility/104
in ecology, in the imbalance of ecosystems in highly industrialized (often over-
industrialized) regions, but also globally.  We seem unaware, incapable of
implementing the responsibility required for the overall functioning of ecosystems
in general.
We can—without being able to develop a whole theory of technical or
technological progress here—start with some remarks about the concept of
technical progress.  It is, first, clear that the concept of "technical progress" has a
normative character.  It is always a comparison to an "is" state, a state of the
system to be aimed at and which motivates the technical solution or operation to
be called "better" if it is achieved. This is the case whenever it can be achieved at
less cost or effort or when we succeed in getting a higher output or a better
achievement with the same input or effort.  The assessment criteria include: the
improvement of quality, longer endurance of product, safety, freedom from
liability, greater precision, feasibility, better control, higher speed, simpler
calculability, and economic efficiency, particularly in terms of costs of production
or maintenance as part of the input-output ratio.
Economists define technical progress simply as increased output in
comparison to equal or less investment of capital or labor.  This would imply that
increases of production stemming from higher morale—as for instance in the
famous Hawthorne experiments—or improved organization without any new
investment of capital or labor, would count as progress; this, however, cannot be
called technical progress in the proper sense.  Friedrich Rapp (see Rapp, Jokisch,
and Lindner, 1980)—taking up von Gottl-Ottlilienfeld's distinction between
technological progress (in knowledge) and genuine technical progress in
society—distinguishes potential from realized or materialized technical progress. 
Von Gottl-Ottlilienfeld had restricted his analysis to so-called "real technology"
(Realtechnik), consisting in the production of material artifacts, applications to
new operations, and "the totality of operations and means of actions needed to
dominate nature" (1923, p. 9).  If one adds social contexts, one has to extend the
concept of progress to social, economic, and other factors.  However, with the
introduction of a concept of socio-technical progress, the specific traits of
technical and technological progress in the narrower sense might easily lose
precision.  Therefore, this terminological shift is not generally to be
recommended.  
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Generally speaking, the overall direction of technical development, if it is
to be called "progressive," cannot be understood purely as an outcome of
economic or technological factors only, but as a complex systemic interplay
among different factors with no mere linear causality involving one factor alone. 
Many authors stress that there are mutual dependencies to be taken into
consideration in the explanation of technological development, and they can only
be grasped in a multidimensional analysis.  That means, generally speaking, that
the concept of a general or an overriding and cumulative or ever-escalating
progress with a kind of dynamics (Eigendynamik) of its own turns out to be an
interpretive construct.  And such a construct could occur in reality only if there
were a permanent interplay among all the mentioned agents and fields of influence
that engender the great complexity of contributions, interconnections and factors. 
What can be called a societal state of progressiveness—or social progress, for
short—is thus a complex integration of many detailed factors, processes, and
subsystems of different kinds.  
The fact that the probability of improvements or advancements must
always be assessed in terms of dependence on former states of development in
technology and science, as well as societal factors, also limits any alleged law of
exponential growth for technical (including technological) progress.  This is
particularly true with respect to any alleged law of constant acceleration.
Turning now to moral assessments or judgments of responsibility, it is
difficult if not impossible in view of these systems effects to attribute the
responsibility for detailed aspects of technical advances to just one individual
technologist or researcher.  If development depends on a multiplicity of mutually
escalating interconnections and interactions, it is not possible to attribute
responsibility to just one person.  
However, in a wider perspective, of responsibility for preventing
accidents or catastrophes—or for an attitude of trust or stewardship for
ecosystems, for example—certainly individual participants, namely technologists,
engineers, and other members of the technological intelligentsia do bear a certain
co-responsibility.  (This is a point stressed by Hans Jonas in his book, The
Imperative of Responsibility, 1979).  On the other hand, these individuals cannot
be assigned total moral responsibility, especially if the harmful effects could not
possibly have been foreseen in advance.  (This is a general problem of the
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individual responsibility of engineers and scientists in applied research which
cannot be dealt with here in detail.)  
Generally speaking, the sorting out of individual responsibilities and the
assignment of different kinds of responsibilities to different bearers (e.g.,
collectives, or persons as role takers or moral agents) poses real and difficult
problems.  And these problems have not yet been analyzed in detail, and they
certainly have not been solved thus far.  It seems true, however, that there should
be collective responsibility for technical operations, procedures, and enterprises;
and this responsibility must be borne by human beings.  (Unless one is prepared to
defend a thesis of a quasi-natural technological process with a dynamic of its
own.)  Technology is an outcome of human activity and initiatives, and it must be
dealt with in terms of responsibility or moral duties even if we must refer
collective responsibilities to human decision-makers.  It is human activity which
promotes technology, even in complex networks and combinations of
accomplishments.  This certainly has consequences for the application of the
concept of responsibility.  No abstract deduction will suffice, and assignments of
responsibility depend on actual contributions of individual participants in the
complex processes.  Such assignments are easiest where it is a matter of
individual misuse, omission, or neglect.
In industrialization and technical progress without social progress, the
situation has become problematic, as we all know very well.  Can we say, then,
that progress in general (whatever that might mean), or even technological
progress, can be responsibly attributed to anyone in particular?  Apparently not.  
However, advancing scientific and technological knowledge certainly does
pose a problem, and that problem grows with the increasing power of technology
in many realms of our society.  In an age of pervasive technology, responsibility
for technological development does pose a more pressing problem than armchair
science did in earlier times.  With the increasing range of effects of technology, it
is clear that problems of responsibility grow considerably.  Cannot even advances
in knowledge be misused?  Can a neat separation between pure science and
technical application still be defended?  (Certainly not, in view of an ever growing
technicalization of science and the simultaneous scientification of technology. 
Differences between basic research and applied research or technology are today
mere differences of accent; the borderline between them has become fluid.)  Has
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not every knowledge claim whatsoever, or every technological discovery, taken
on a kind of ambivalence or Janus-like characteristic?
Generally speaking, the moral and ethical problems associated with
technological procedures are certainly not new.  Already in earlier times a knife
could be misused.  Only the range of effects and the magnitude of risks have
grown to the point that there is a danger of the self-destruction of humankind.  In
addition, unforeseen side effects have grown with the broader range of
technological activities and their effectiveness.  Now, the traditional ethical
regulations of behavior with which humans throughout their evolutionary history
have constrained themselves seem to be overextended.  The ethics of loving one's
neighbor does not suffice in an age of pervasive global technology with remote
effects and interconnections to other continents.  If just pressing a button can kill
hundreds of thousands of humans, or injure or harm millions, even humankind
itself, then traditional regulations of actions and their respective motivating
concepts—which were developed from face to face encounters in our
sociobiological evolution—will certainly fail.
It seems necessary therefore to deal with problems of responsibility in a
more specific way, with separate responsibilities for individual agents, for
collective decision makers, for whole nations, as well as for humankind in
general.  It is not just the solutions of technical problems or the increases of
technological power (even though we have become dependent on them) that
determine our future, but the social and ethical problems associated with them that
have to be solved.  And these have been neglected in recent decades.  Certainly,
we are dependent on technical and technological advances, but we must
implement them in a wise manner.  Searching for wisdom is still the traditional
burden of philosophy—but also its opportunity.  Philosophers to the front!  We
must meet this down-to-earth challenge of developing a comprehensive ethics that
includes responsibilities for both individual and collective agents in an age of
pervasive and ever-accelerating technology.
I will here discuss two examples where philosophers can practically
contribute to this endeavor—and have done so.  Later, I will present briefly some
conceptual typologies of responsibilities, at the same time relating them to
nontechnical values in technical contexts.  I will there paraphrase earlier work of
my own on the typology and differentiation of different kinds and analytic models
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of responsibilities (Lenk, 1982, 1991, 1992; Lenk and Ropohl, 1987).  I will, as
my second example, report on an initiative of the German Engineers Association
(Verein Deutscher Ingenieure) which has developed  guidelines for handling value
issues in technical activities, including technology assessment; they were designed
by a subgroup of which I have been a member for more than a dozen years (see
Lenk, 1992).
Before getting to these examples, I note that, within the course of history,
humankind has never had at its disposal as much material abundance, as much
power and energy as today.  This is due to technology and its progress.   And
technology is no longer a mere instrument; it is a world-changing, a world-
shaping, a world-making factor—on which it is, I think, very important to reflect.
In proportion to its powers, technologically multiplied to an extreme, 
humankind's responsibilities have grown if not exploded.  Today, much more than
hitherto, large-scale ethical and moral problems have grown in step with the
extended technological power humans have to disturb the non-human environment
or nature—a power that allows us to manipulate and tamper with life, including
human life.  Because of tremendous technological power, because of the scope of
technological activity, a new situation requiring a new ethical orientation seems to
be evolving, and it obviously calls for new rules of behavior.  Even if some basic
definition of the good remains constant, the executive rules applying ethics to the
conditions of today must be changed, must be adapted to new possibilities of
behavior, to new activities with new effects; and this includes also institutional
arrangements and responsibilities.  All of which is a very tough question to tackle. 
Eventually we will discover as well as suffer from paradoxes, natural and social
traps, limited resources, overburdened systems, and overextended capacities. 
Technology assessment—our means for dealing with such issues—thus becomes a
matter of necessity, even when it requires us to take on the difficult but important
task of anticipation.  Technology assessment must be anticipatory.
In relation to ethical questions of responsibility, what is new about this
situation?  In brief, there are six factors.
First, the number of people affected by technological measures or their
side effects has increased tremendously, as everybody knows.  
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Second, natural systems are now subject to human activity, at least in the
negative way that humans can permanently disturb or destroy them by their
technological impacts.  Again, everyone has heard about the CO problem.  2
Third, humans as well are now subjected to technological manipulation in
ways they were not before, not only by pharmacological means and in terms of
mass suggestion or subconscious influences, but also, at least potentially, by
genetic engineering.  
Fourth, moreover, we seem to be observing a progressive trend which
might be called a systems technocracy or an informational technocracy.  By this I
mean a technocratic trend of combining bureaucracy or red tape with the
progressive development of microelectronics, data storage, retrieval, and
processing, etc.  This is taking place in public administration, in organizations
handling computer-stored information, and so on.  Personal privacy is likely to be
endangered by all these developments if they are widely implemented.  And then
all the problems of data protection linked to the information and systems
revolution will also emerge.  
Fifth, technocracy in any guise brings other problems. Edward Teller, the
so-called father of the hydrogen bomb, once stated in an interview that, "The
scientist or technologist ought to apply everything he has understood and should
not put limits on that.  Whatever you understand, you should also apply."  This, to
my mind, represents an ideology, of what some have called the  "technocratic
imperative."  It turns Immanuel Kant's old dictum, "Ought implies can," into a
reverse technological imperative, "Can implies ought."  Whether or not humanity
is allowed to, or ought to, initiate, apply, make, produce, or carry out everything
that is possible, certainly represents a serious ethical problem, indeed.  
Sixth, in the increased possibilities of manipulation, in the biomedical as
well as the ecological context, the problem of responsibility for unborn
individuals, for future generations, for the future of humankind, as well as for
natural (sometimes partially human-made) ecosystems, including natural species,
we have another dramatic problem.
I want now to turn to my experience (mentioned earlier) as a  member of
the working group of the German Engineer's Association (Verein Deutscher
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Ingenieure).  In a subgroup, "Humanity and Technology:  the Engineering
Profession and Society," we developed a set of guidelines, the "VDI-Richtlinie"
(VDI 3780) of the Association.  After twelve years of cooperative work and
dedicated committee involvement it was officially adopted in 1991 (see Lenk,
1992).  The official title is, "Technology Assessment:  Concepts and Foundations"
(Technikbewertung:  Begriffe und Grundlagen).  The work highlights and defines
the function and significance for technology, for technical decision-making,
technological activity, etc., of various socio-technical and social systems,
including non-technical values.  The purpose was to instruct, to sensitize, and to
help the practitioner in planning and technological decision-making:  but it was
also to help the reflective engineer on the job with regard to the role of values,
notably social values, goals, aims, attitudes, needs, and specific interactions when
he or she is involved in technological planning, acting, or decision-making.  We
were not proposing ex cathedra decrees.  We cannot relieve the engineer, the
technological administrator or manager or entrepreneur, of his or her
responsibility in deciding.  But such reflections, instructions, and information may
help sensitize decision-makers and practitioners.  
Here, without comment, are some of the topics touched on:











  technical efficiency
- degree of efficiency
- full utilization of material(s)
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- productivity
...
Economic Efficiency (private or corporate)
  profitability
  (cost minimization)
  security of corporation
  growth of corporation
  ...
(Public) Wealth (national and international economy)
  supply of needs and wants
  quantitative vs. qualitative growth
  international competitive position
  full employment
  distributive justice
  ...
Safety
  freedom from physical injury
  protecting individual lives
  protecting and safeguarding the existence of mankind
  minimization of risks (extent and probability of harm)





  physical well-being
  psychic well-being
  increasing life expectancy
  minimization of direct and indirect health risks, strains and burdens
- at work
- in private life
- by pollution, polluting products and production processes
Quality of the Environment
  protection of nature, landscapes and ecosystems
  protection of natural species
  conservation and saving of resources
  minimizing emissions and polluting deposits
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Personality Development and Quality of Social Life
  liberty (freedom of action)
  freedom of information and opinions
  creativity
  guaranteeing privacy and informational autonomy
  participatory opportunities
  control, survey and command
  social contact and acknowledgement
  solidarity and cooperation
  cultural identity
  sufficient minimal agreement on basic values
  order, stability and rule-governed systems and processes
  transparency and public availability
  justice
  ...
We find here a wide range of values, ideas, goals, aims and general
objectives which are related to technological activity and decision-making.  As I
said, I cannot comment in detail here.  But the interrelationships and interactions
between the different major types of values and their subspecies or kinds—for
instance, between health and safety—are obvious.  By contrast, there is likely to
be conflict between some aims: e.g., between economic efficiency (at least for
private firms) and the quality of the environment.
Next I want to proceed to my second example of a way philosophers can
help out in our present situation.  I will merely summarize work I have done
before on the complicated web of technological responsibilities and priorities in
dealing with them, particularly in technological activities and decision-making (see
Lenk, 1991).  Typically, codes of ethics or declarations or statements,
fundamental principles, canons or guidelines by technological societies or
engineering associations only mention the global responsibility of the engineer or
manager, or of the employee or worker.  And there is no differentiation as to
what kinds or types of responsibilities there are—including conflicts among them. 
This led me to formulate a theory of the types of responsibilities as a first step to
be able later on to analyze and possibly help resolve conflicts between the
different kinds of responsibilities.
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First of all, the concept of responsibility is relational; it is a theoretical or
interpretive construct designating at least a five-place relation:  a person is
responsible for something, with respect to another person, in view of a standard,
and with regard to some authority.  And all of this must pertain to a specific level;
for instance, the responsibility might be moral or legal or contractual.  The entity
or authority to which I may be held responsible may be a person (a parent, for
instance), who may have a special role, or an institution, a corporation, an
organization, or the law, the state, society, humankind or the ideal of humankind,
or God.  I shall not go into details but merely summarize my views schematically.
The first classification is in terms of responsibilities for types of actions
(including omissions or neglect):
_________________________________________________________________





positive negative  responsibility  responsibility
causal responsi- for long-range  for institu-
responsi- bility (e.g., patterns or        tional or
bility for neglect or activities group actions
particular omission)
actions
(preventive responsibility in any representative
of these 3) responsibility
Figure 1:  Types of Action Responsibility
_________________________________________________________________
These are not self-explanatory, but I will assume that the thrust is
generally clear.
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The second set of distinctions has to do with role or task responsibilities:
________________________________________________________________
role-         task loyalty corporate
execution         responsi- responsibilities responsibili-
responsi-               bilities    ties of insti-
bilities tutions (to
formal or informal insiders or
outsiders):
legal or representative (e.g., organizational,
     manager, board member) moral, or
legal





Figure 2:  Role and Task Responsibilities
________________________________________________________________
Again I will assume that the general thrust is clear, even though there are
details that require explanation.
The third schema deals specifically with moral responsibilities
(recognizing that some of the earlier categories would not generally be classified
as moral):
_________________________________________________________________
responsibilities   responsi-   specific     corporate
to others                       bilities to       responsi-    responsi-
                               self         bility to    bilities of
direct      or     indirect                       meet con-    institu-
(situation-  (with re-                      tractual    tions
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activated:      spect to                    or formal
effect on  remote con-               obligations  
other in-    sequences
dividual    of actions                  obeying job-
human or     or omissions)               related
non-human)                                 code of ethics
all of which involve:
responsibilities for the
safety, health, and welfare
of the public
joint responsibilities               or                group responsibilities
of individuals, according
to degree of influence
Figure 3:  Moral Responsibilities
________________________________________________________________
Here a comment is called for.  I take all moral responsibilities to be
universal, and they remain so even when they are linked to specific role or task
responsibilities (not necessarily moral).  Furthermore, I assume that moral
responsibilities are the most important, and they cannot be diminished, divided up,
or dissolved; certainly they do not vanish, no matter how many people are
involved.
The ways that these schemes can be applied in assessing technical
decisions can be exemplified in a famous case, that of the DC10 airliner involved
in a crash near Paris in 1974 (See Eddy, Potter, and Page, 1976).  In 1972, three
inspectors of the Douglas Long Beach plant in California had wrongly approved
modifications of a fatally dangerous cargo door locking system, when no work on
the cargo door had actually been done.  This was one (admittedly only one)
decisive factor in the crash over Paris.  Usually, there is more than one factor,
and that is the problem: how to follow the different chains linking these different
factors which lead to a catastrophe or a major accident.  
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Corporate moral responsibility on the part of institutions is also
relevant—assuming, that is, that corporations have moral responsibilities.  (And
this is still highly controversial; see French, 1984.)  Laws and the affected people
may change, but the relationship of moral responsibility might still obtain.  For
instance, one of the best known cases in business ethics is that of the Johns
Mansville firm and asbestos production during World War II.  It was only in 1947
that engineering and other professional codes of ethics began to include
responsibility for the safety, health, and welfare of the public among their
guidelines—some even saying it is of "paramount" importance.  
An obligation to abide by the ethics code of one’s professional society, for
instance, an engineering society, certainly is also a moral obligation—as obeying
the law is also a moral obligation, though at a higher level of responsibility.  Thus
we must make different moral distinctions at different levels.
In considering different types of responsibility, we must also develop
priority rules:  for example, that moral responsibility takes precedence over role-
responsibility.  What follows is an attempt to provide a first sketch of such a set of
rules:
1.  Moral rights of individuals are predistributive rights, overriding utility
considerations.
2.  In a compromise, the interests of everyone should be taken into
consideration on an equal basis; in cases of unresolvable conflict between equally
relevant basic rights, this condition is especially important.
3.  Only after considering the moral rights of all parties should one opt
for a solution, and then it should be one that causes the least damage or that
maximizes utility for all the involved parties.
4.  After rules 1, 2 and 3 have been invoked, utility considerations should
be weighed against potential harms.  In general, nonalienable or predistributive
moral rights are prior to considerations of avoiding harm, and these latter are
prior to utility considerations.  (For these first four rules, see Werhane, 1985, p.
72.)
5.  When the weighing of harms or utilities generates unresolvable
conflicts, one must seek a compromise that distributes them equally, or at least
proportionally.
6.  A general or higher level moral responsibility is to be preferred over
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restricted or non-moral obligations, even if they are prima facie.
7.  Universal moral responsibility, generally speaking, takes precedence
over role and task responsibilities.
8.  Direct responsibility is usually, but not always, prior to indirect
responsibilities for remote consequences.  However, this ranking must necessarily
be modified if the consequences are especially serious or have very long-lasting
impacts.
9.  Primary, i.e., personal, moral responsibility precedes corporate
responsibility.
         10.  The common weal or public good precedes all other particular or
specialized interests.
In 1990, discussions of responsibility and engineering education led to the
drafting, by a German Commission of Engineering Education, of a declaration of
the responsibilities of engineers and natural scientists.  This declaration stresses
the importance of reliable basic knowledge, but it also stresses the necessity of
taking into account—beyond economic criteria—those ecological and social
criteria that are conducive to conserving and securing the natural basis of life. 
"Engineers should be able to make statements about positive and negative
consequences for natural and social contexts of the application or non-application
of technology, and preferably at the appropriate time."  They should try to foster
impartial and knowledgeable discussion of large-scale technological developments. 
Professors in technical fields, according to the declaration, must, more than
before, acknowledge and exercise their interdisciplinary responsibility, integrating
social concerns within their teaching.  They should, according to this guideline,
organize case-study seminars, directly related to technical topics; they should also
be willing to collaborate, providing technical examples, in interdisciplinary
seminars.  In addition, a need for continuing education in these issues was
stressed.  
Unfortunately, there is no mention in the document of  responsibility
types, of conflicts, of priority rules, of all the intriguing and difficult problems
which I have just mentioned.  And that is still the usual case.  
Interestingly enough, neither the German Conference of University
Rectors nor that of the more practice-oriented Technical Colleges (the
Fachhochschulen) signed this declaration.  However, most engineering and
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natural science professional societies did.
In conclusion, I want to give a short overview of the state of the debate
regarding codes of ethics in technology.  This declaration by the German
Commission of Engineering Education amounted to a kind of code of ethics for
technology and engineering education.  The American Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers had earlier paved the way by giving a paragon example of
an ethics code, while also institutionalizing boards, procedures, and sanctions as
well as publications, discussion material and conferences.  These were added
because codes by themselves are only appeals, and appeals do not have binding
force.  They are not enough; codes alone will not do the job.  That is why the
Guidelines of the American Association of Engineering Societies of 1984 stressed
professional conduct, that is, the incorporation within their behavior of rules and
norms on the part of engineers and other technological practitioners.
There is still a long way to go in the direction of sensitizing, of helping
the "ethical engineer" (as he or she is sometimes called in the United States).  The
engineer is not obliged to become a martyr, losing his or her job; but neither may
the engineer close his or her eyes and carry out unethical, or even unlawful,
orders forced on him or her by supervisors or firms.  Engineers are, and should
be, responsible citizens both on the job and elsewhere.  They are human beings,
with personalities and moral responsibilities which cannot be deposited in the
cloakroom, so to speak.  Moral responsibilities cannot be diminished by giving
them to others or anything of that sort.
Engineers—and other experts and technical practitioners—usually do
dutifully exercise their professional and humanistic responsibilities, but much can
still be done to improve the situation, to deepen their consciousness of moral and
social responsibilities, as well as of potential conflicts between them and their
personal consciences.  The humanities and social sciences can and should help
make them aware of intricacies and conflicts, of the complicated interplay of
values and norms with contracts and laws, etc.  At the same time, none of this
should detract from the engineer's professional responsibility or freedom of
decision-making and acting.
Beside Mens agitat molem [mind can move mountains], an ancient
engineering slogan, I think that Humanitas praestat  [humanity comes first] must
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be a necessary complementary slogan in engineering, in engineering education,
and in continuing education.
It is an especially challenging task of the humanities, and of philosophy in
particular, to make this imperative work, unobtrusively helping the engineer, the
practitioner, the manager, the entrepreneur, as well as political decision-makers to
know how to abide by social, moral, and humanistic values and norms.  They
should also help solve or at least mitigate conflicts among them.  And they should
fulfill the ancient obligation of the humanities to share in the work that is needed
for the survival and progress of humankind in our complicated technological
world.
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